Saturday, January 15, 2005

Yahoo! News - Report: FBI botched internal spying probe

Yahoo! News - Report: FBI botched internal spying probe: "Top Stories - Chicago Tribune

Report: FBI botched internal spying probe

Sat Jan 15, 9:40 AM ET Top Stories - Chicago Tribune
By Andrew Zajac Washington Bureau
A former FBI (news - web sites) linguist's allegations of possible espionage involving a colleague are credible but still have not been properly examined nearly three years after they were made, according to a new internal Justice Department (news - web sites) report released Friday.

In his review, Justice Department Inspector General Glenn Fine also concluded that the linguist, Sibel Edmonds, was fired in April 2002 in large part because of her whistle-blowing activity and that the dismissal could have a chilling effect on the willingness of FBI employees to report wrongdoing in the future.

The 37-page assessment documents a superficial inquiry marked by sloppy interviews, shallow research and an unwillingness to look beyond what the department's investigators acknowledged was Edmonds' sometimes difficult personality.

While making no judgment on the merits of her claims of serious security breaches, the report said they "were supported by various pieces of evidence" and that "the FBI did not, and still has not adequately investigated these allegations."

In a statement Friday, the FBI said an investigation into Edmonds' allegations is ongoing. It also cited an e-mail sent last summer to bureau employees from FBI Director Robert Mueller in which he pledged "his commitment to protecting from retaliation all employees, including contractors . . . who raise good faith concerns."

The inspector general's findings are the second black eye for the nation's top law-enforcement agency in two days. On Thursday, the bureau acknowledged that it likely will scrap a highly touted $170 million computer system for tracking cases because of flaws.

Problems exposed

The report also calls further attention to the FBI's already struggling foreign-language translation program.

Last October, Fine issued a review disclosing that the bureau had a backlog of more than 100,000 hours of audio in languages used by suspected terrorists and was hard-pressed to find qualified linguists.

The shoddy internal inquiry in Edmonds' case was particularly troubling to Fine because it came barely a year after the February 2001 arrest of Robert Hanssen (news - web sites), the former FBI agent whose selling of secrets to Moscow went undetected for years, despite reports from co-workers of troubling behavior.

"The Hanssen case demonstrates that an individual reporting a security-related concern about another employee may not have the whole story, but may provide sufficient information to focus attention on a person deserving of further scrutiny," the report said in a footnote.

The Edmonds report was originally 100 pages and was completed last July, but classified "Secret."

After Sens. Patrick Leahy (D-Vt.) and Charles Grassley (R-Iowa) pressed for public release of the findings, the FBI negotiated with Fine's office and produced Friday's summary, stripped of classified material. Both senators criticized the bureau for its treatment of Edmonds.

Edmonds was hired in late September 2001 as a contract employee to translate surveillance wiretaps that were in Turkish.

Some allegations valid

According to records from a lawsuit Edmonds filed to get her job back, she suspected that the co-worker, a Turkish linguist in Washington, failed to translate transcripts of recorded conversations involving people she knew, steered co-workers away from certain recordings and leaked wiretap information to acquaintances.

Edmonds also made other accusations that Fine said could not be substantiated. But he said most of the complaints involving the co-worker, who was not named and no longer works for the FBI, warrant scrutiny.

Mark Zaid, the attorney for Edmonds, said the report vindicates her. "Not only does the bureau owe her an apology but compensation for her termination," he said.

Edmonds is appealing a federal judge's dismissal of her lawsuit last summer. The judge accepted the Justice Department's argument that a trial would expose national secrets.

Zaid said Fine's findings will bolster Edmonds' appeal, but she also is suing to get release of the entire document.

The review said that Edmonds "was not an easy employee to manage" and that she had used her home computer to write some of her complaints containing classified information, which the bureau considered a security violation.

But, the report concludes, "we believe that the FBI did not take [her allegations] seriously enough" and they were "the most significant factor in the FBI's decision to terminate her services.""

Jerusalem Post Puts David Szady in the Cross Hairs

Jerusalem Post | Breaking News from Israel, the Middle East and the Jewish World: "Why has AIPAC been targeted?

Janine Zacharia, THE JERUSALEM POST Dec. 5, 2004
What prompted the years-long FBI investigation into the activities of AIPAC, which featured this past summer's "setup" of two AIPAC officials now revealed by the Post, and which has reached its height with the issuing of subpoenas last week?

Some speculate that there are those in the intelligence community who have grown irritated and resentful about the level of access AIPAC is afforded at the very highest echelons in Washington.

With the shadow of the Jonathan Pollard affair still looming large in Washington 17 years after the US navy analyst was convicted and imprisoned for life for passing classified information to Israel, there is, too, the possibility that investigators may have been motivated by a suspicion of American Jewish "dual loyalties" – to the US and Israel.

Having realized the magnitude of the damage done by the Pollard episode, Israel publicly declared an end to spying in the US. But American Jews seeking employment in intelligence agencies are still often hamstrung by security checks that prevent them from obtaining employment or rising in the ranks, apparently because of the "dual loyalties" suspicion.

Whatever the motivation for the investigation, few Washington insiders understand why or how AIPAC would be involved in illegal, or espionage-related activities, given the potential repercussions and given the lobby's clout and power in the capital. And many in the Jewish community in particular are doubtful that any accusations of espionage against AIPAC will hold up.

Senior AIPAC officials have regular contact with the most senior administration officials and exchange information regularly on all aspects of Middle East policy.

Howard Kohr, the lobby's executive director, has routine conversations with officials as high up as National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice. Officials at all levels of the organization have regular policy discussions, the kind of discussions that AIPAC officials believe the FBI are trying to portray as espionage.

AIPAC's annual spring policy conference in Washington draws thousands and features speeches by senior administration officials and congressional leaders. Just a few weeks ago, Rice, undeterred by the ongoing investigation, appeared before an AIPAC conference in Florida.

On Friday, Rep. Robert Wexler, a Jewish Democratic congressman from south Florida, sent a second letter to US President George W. Bush expressing "deep concern" about the FBI's ongoing investigation of the lobby group, and urging the president to provide members of Congress with detailed information about the AIPAC probe.

Wexler called on Bush to immediately dismiss David Szady, the senior FBI counterintelligence official who is heading the investigation.

Senior Jewish community officials have accused Szady of targeting Jews in the past by blocking or slowing their security clearances.

As journalist and author Edwin Black reported for the Jewish Telegraphic Agency in September, Szady headed a CIA counterespionage group, which tried to force the Jewish former CIA staff attorney Adam Ciralsky out of the agency, by documenting and probing his past contacts with Israel.

The issuing of subpoenas last week to four AIPAC officials to appear before a grand jury later this month could mean that indictments are in the works. If so, the circumstances that triggered the probe will become evident, as will the nature and gravity of any alleged wrongdoing."

Friday, January 14, 2005

Joel Mowbray Joins in Szady Smear

FrontPage :: The Spies Who Aren't by Joel Mowbray: "The Spies Who Aren't
By Joel Mowbray | September 17, 2004

The past couple weeks have seen a swirl of anonymous allegations of supposed spying and espionage, including implications that the Pentagon civilian staff might be teeming with double agents for the Jewish state.

Thing is, almost none of it is true.

Beyond mishandling of classified documents—not an inconsequential offense, to be sure—every other accusation leveled by unnamed State Department and intelligence officials appears part of a carefully calculated campaign to question the loyalty of several Pentagon civilian employees by name, as well as a much larger group by implication.

According to someone with intimate knowledge of the draft presidential directive that low-level Pentagon Iran analyst Larry Franklin allegedly leaked to the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), the document contained no sources and no methods. It had no sensitive material of any kind. It was nothing more than a policy paper—just a few pages that resembled an opinion-editorial—advocating tougher diplomacy, not war, in dealing with Iran.

Why was it marked “secret?” Nearly every document emerging out of that Pentagon office was stamped secret—the lowest grade of secrecy. A memo about an office Christmas party would probably be classified secret too.

If guilty, Franklin should be appropriately punished. But what about others who are inexplicably being lumped into the same smear campaign?

Bandying about words like “espionage” and “spying,” as many news outlets have, serves the goals of the State Department and the CIA, the mortal policy enemies of the hawks at the Pentagon. But unlike previous leak campaigns, State and CIA’s latest effort may have crossed into dangerous territory.

Most politically appointed administration officials on the foreign policy team who support President Bush’s agenda seem to have at least an uneasy feeling that the anonymous smear campaign flirts dangerously close to classic anti-Semitic libels.

Others are of decidedly less mixed opinion. Says one official, “It is not a witch hunt; it is a pogrom.”

Looking at the media coverage, particularly that of the Washington Post, and the reported conduct of the investigation, it is not difficult to understand the officials’ concern.

Though Franklin is Catholic, few articles mention that he is not Jewish, and none from the Post do so. He is far down the food chain, yet almost every story identifies him as an employee of Feith, who is Jewish, even though the undersecretary for policy is some six levels removed and oversees over 1,000 subordinates.

Tarring specific so-called neoconservatives, a September 4 Post story with no other clear purpose identified by name five other Pentagon officials about whom “investigators have asked questions.” All five individuals are Jewish, and according to the piece, “have strong ties to Israel.”

Driving home the smear, the story informs readers that three of them “were co-authors of a 1996 policy paper for then-Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu.” The paper in question, however, was neither commissioned nor funded by Netanyahu or the Israeli government. It was unsolicited advice, no different than the papers and op-eds written by thousands of Washington policy wonks attempting to persuade various individuals or entities, including foreign leaders or governments.

The reported track record of the FBI agent in charge of the investigation, FBI assistant director of counterintelligence David Szady, is also troubling. Szady has for years “led investigations into Jewish American CIA employees believed to be spying for Israel that have also failed to persuade the Justice Department even to investigate the cases,” reports Eli Lake of the New York Sun.

That’s not all. Stephen Green, who reportedly was interviewed by the FBI for four hours relating to this case (the FBI refused comment), is a free-lance writer on a two-decade long quest to prove that Paul Wolfowitz, Doug Feith, and other Jews are actually embedded Israeli spies. Some twenty years of futility later, Green is suddenly all the rage with leftist blogs and “news” sites, as well as (frighteningly) some mainstream news outlets.

Until his newfound popularity on the left and in the Arab press, Green’s staunchest support had come from Institute of Historical Review (IHR), which is perhaps best known for its denial of the Holocaust. Green’s two books that purport to document Israel’s vast network of Jewish spies working in the U.S. government have received rave reviews from the Holocaust deniers.

And now Green is being utilized by the FBI.

For those curious about the origins of this seemingly sprawling investigation, a quote in the September 4 Post story seems particularly revealing: “The initial interest was: Do you believe certain people would spy for Israel and pass secret information?” which was attributed to “one source interviewed by the FBI about the defense officials.”

In other words, it appears that this investigation started without a scintilla of evidence, and it was sparked solely because of “beliefs.”

Two days earlier, the Post reported that this investigation is “more than two years old.” Yet in those two years, the Post reported on September 4, all investigators have on the five named Jews in the Pentagon are “suspicions,” which the Post also noted may not even be “specific.”

What those five officials have (courtesy of the Post), however, is a taint that will not soon disappear, regardless of their actual innocence.

Joel Mowbray is author of Dangerous Diplomacy: How the State Department Threatens America’s Security."

Eli Lake's Smear of David Szady in

'Spy'case not what originally claimed: "‘Spy’ case not what originally claimed by GOTCHA! media

By Eli Lake | An investigation into a mid-level Pentagon analyst is likely to focus on the misuse of classified materials, senior law enforcement officials told The New York Sun, and not the much more serious charge of espionage on behalf of Israel.

The investigation into Larry Franklin, an Iran analyst who worked in the Pentagon's policy shop, is being led by David Szady, the head of counterintelligence for the FBI. Mr. Szady, who used to lead the CIA's counterintelligence espionage unit, has developed a reputation in the intelligence community for chasing phantoms. For years, Mr. Szady pursued CIA official Brian Kelly who was believed to be a Russian mole, when the whole time the FBI's own Robert Hanssen was Moscow's spy. Mr. Szady has also led investigations into Jewish American CIA employees believed to be spying for Israel that have also failed to persuade the Justice Department even to investigate the cases.

Mr. Franklin, who is not Jewish, has been a longtime analyst of Iran who one colleague described as "mild mannered and patriotic but at times exasperating." An avid practitioner of martial arts, Mr. Franklin was a former employee of the Defense Intelligence Agency where he often clashed with senior agency officials on their estimates of Iranian-directed terrorist activities.

Over the weekend, the Washington Post reported that Mr. Franklin was under investigation for slipping a draft Iran policy paper, known as a National Security Policy Directive, to members of the American Israel Public Affairs Committee. A former American official familiar with the document said it was classified "secret" and did not contain either intelligence sources or the methods of gathering intelligence.

A senior law enforcement official and administration sources told the Sun that the Franklin investigation stems from a two-year FBI probe into who leaked top secret war plans for Iraq published by the New York Times on July 5, 2002.

This is not a matter of U.S. security being damaged," a senior law enforcement official said. "And the material wasn't of a top secret nature — it was draft policy papers and position papers and stuff like that. The Israelis could have gotten the same stuff from conversations with their counterparts at State or the White House.

At a July 21, 2002, press conference Mr. Rumsfeld said, "It's inexcusable, and they ought to be in jail." In a memo circulated to the Pentagon, Mr. Rumsfeld condemned the improper disclosure of classified information and encouraged staff members to put an end to the practice. "I have spoken publicly and privately, countless times, about the danger of leaking classified information," he wrote. "It is wrong. It is against the law."

More recently at a Senate Armed Services Committee hearing on August 17, Mr. Rumsfeld speculated, "I wonder if our government can keep a secret."

Senior law enforcement officials and administration sources told the Sun that the official under investigation, Mr. Franklin, would not likely be charged with espionage. The Washington Post and CBS News reports over the weekend mentioned the possibility of espionage charges.

"This is not a matter of U.S. security being damaged," a senior law enforcement official said. "And the material wasn't of a top secret nature — it was draft policy papers and position papers and stuff like that. The Israelis could have gotten the same stuff from conversations with their counterparts at State or the White House.""

Statement on Brian Patrick Regan case by U.S. Attorney Paul McNulty

: "Statement on case by U.S. Attorney Paul McNulty

Brian Patrick Regan
July 30, 2003

Good Afternoon. I am Paul McNulty, United States Attorney for the Eastern District of Virginia. With me today are:

David Szady, Assistant Director, Counter-Intelligence Division, FBI
onald Nesbitt, Special Agent in Charge for National Security Division, FBI
Lydia Jechoret, Supervisory Special Agent, FBI
Stephen Carr, Special Agent, FBI
Steve Doyle, US DOJ
Patricia Haynes, Assistant US Attorney, EDVA
Jim Gillis, Assistant US Attorney, EDVA
Colonel Debra Donahoo - Director or Counterintelligence - NRO
Two Conservation Officers from the Virginia Department of Conservation & Recreation:
David Summers and
Dan Quesenberry

We are here today to tell the full story of Brian Patrick Regan's betrayal of his country. We want you to see the magnitude of the damage this man was willing to inflict on his country and fellow citizens.

Regan was sentenced last Spring to spend the rest of his life in prison for attempting to sell national security information to our enemies. At the time, we were only able to describe his traitorous acts in general terms because we were still assessing the damage he would have caused if his betrayal was successful. The whereabouts of all the material he stole and buried away had not been identified.

Today we can now report that more than 20,000 pages of classified documents, CD ROMS and videotapes have been found. These materials were buried in 19 different locations in State Parks in Virginia and Maryland.

Just look at the volume of classified materials gathered here. Some is Top Secret; some is Top Secret Codeword. The documents and information concerned satellites, early warning systems, and weapons of mass destruction, among other classified topics. All of it pertains to the national security of the United States.

Brian Patrick Regan stole this material. He systematically removed thousands of pages of classified documents and other information from the National Reconnaissance Office, where he worked as a signals intelligence officer.

Regan admitted that he took those documents from the NRO with two objectives: To sell them for millions of dollars to Iraq, Libya, China and Iran, and
To blackmail the United States should he get caught.

The classified information that Brian Regan was carrying when he was arrested was only a fraction of what he intended to sell to our adversaries.

Fortunately, because of the extraordinary work of the FBI and the NRO, Regan was prevented from pulling off what may have been one of the largest espionage schemes of all time.

These two parks, the Pocohontas State Park in Virginia and the Patapsco Valley State Park in Maryland are used by thousands of American families every year. They were also used by Regan to hide the secrets he stole. He buried this information in 19 holes - 7 in Maryland and 12 in Virginia.

Regan used a complex coding system to record the locations of the buried packages. To further safeguard these locations, he buried the code containing the locations. We found that container - it was a tooth brush holder and it was buried near the "Fredricksburg" sign by exit 130A of Route 95 South.

Regan also went so far as to attempt to involve his wife in his crime. He asked her to bury a number of items, such as magazines and toys in a variety of places. His plan was to assert his innocense by saying the holes he dug in the parks were just part of a game of treasure hunt he planned to play with his children.

Over the last five months, the FBI and the NRO, along with other members of the intelligence community, have dedicated themselves to recovering these hidden classified documents, and they have done so.

In anticipation of two questions I am sure you will ask:

We are confident that every last page has been recovered.
And, we are also confident that none of the 20,000 pages of classified information, the CD ROMs or the videotapes ever made it to foreign hands.

As Trish Haynes and Jim Gillis so eloquently stated at trial, Brian Patrick Regan took an oath of loyalty to the United States. He was entrusted with many of our nation's most highly classified military secrets. Regan violated that trust. He dishonored his uniform. He was willing to compromise our military secrets, the safety of our armed forces, and the integrity of intelligence systems vital to the security of our country. And when he was caught, he was willing to blackmail the United States into setting him free.

Our successful prosecution of Brian Patrick Regan serves as a warning to anyone willing to try to betray our country - you will fail. The United States can and will protect the information relating to its national security, and the safety of the people of the United States, and you will pay the price for your betrayal.

Again, I want to commend the men and women who worked so hard to recover this material."

The Jewish Journal Of Greater Los Angeles Targets Szady with Smear

The Jewish Journal Of Greater Los Angeles: "2004-09-24

Does AIPAC Prober Target Jews?
by Edwin Black, Jewish Telegraphic Agency
David Szady, the senior FBI counterintelligence official currently heading the controversial investigation of the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), is well-known to senior Jewish communal officials, who assert he has targeted Jews in the past."

Forward Newspaper Publishes SZady Smear that Emanates from AEI

Forward Newspaper Online: "

Leading neoconservative figure Michael Rubin of the American Enterprise Institute added his own thought. “This is a war of the intelligence community versus the neoconservatives,” Rubin observed. “It involves both the right and the left of the intelligence community. It is a war about policy, the point being, the CIA must not be involved in policy. The CIA’s role is to provide intelligence and let the policymakers decide what to do with it, and it appears they are not sticking to that role — and that is a dangerous situation. This is the politicizing of intelligence. But the CIA, by its establishing principles, is not to be involved in politics.”

Rubin added that the sting effort “against Aipac is the culmination of a 20-year witch hunt from a small corps within the counterintelligence community” that Rubin labeled “conspiracy theorists.” He added, “What is the common denominator between the Ciralsky case and the Aipac case? David Szady.”

Szady, who has been decorated twice by the CIA for distinguished service, answered one critic, writing, “I am not at liberty to comment on pending investigations.” Szady had issued a statement to this reporter earlier that he “has no antisemitic views, has never handled a case or investigation based upon an individual’s ethnicity or religious views, and would never do so.”

One neoconservative at the center of the counterintelligence war said: “This is just the beginning. Nobody knows where this war is going.”"

Jewish News of Greater Phoenix publishes Jewish Telegraphic Agency mear of Szady

AIPAC prober linked to anti-Semitism: "September 24, 2004/Tishri 9 5765, Vol. 57, No. 4

AIPAC prober linked to anti-Semitism
Jewish Telegraphic Agency
WASHINGTON - David Szady, the senior FBI counterintelligence official currently heading the controversial investigation of the American Israel Public Affairs Committee, is well-known to senior Jewish communal officials, who assert he has targeted Jews in the past."

Congressman Robert Wexler Joins the Smear of David Szady

Congressman Robert Wexler: 19th District of Florida: "Contacts: Dana Kelly
Phone: (202) 225-3001

September 29, 2004
Press Release
Wexler Urges Bush to Investigate AIPAC Probe

FBI Official Leading Case Has Alleged Ties to Anti-Semitism

( Washington, D.C.) – Today Congressman Robert Wexler (D-FL) sent the following letter to President Bush calling on him to investigate David Szady, a senior FBI counterintelligence official leading the bureau’s investigation of an alleged espionage case involving the American Israeli Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC). Wexler asks Bush to determine whether or not Mr. Szady has a record of unfairly targeting Jews, and if so, urges the President to remove Mr. Szady from the AIPAC case and dismiss him from his post. Wexler also asks President Bush to re-examine the AIPAC probe and consider whether it may have been instigated by anti-Jewish sentiment within the CIA and the FBI.

Wexler raises the possibility that Szady may have led the charge against AIPAC due to his personal bias against Jews. In 1997, as head of the CIA’s Counter Espionage Group (CEG), Mr. Szady was in charge of a unit investigating CIA attorney Adam Ciralsky’s alleged dual loyalties with Israel based merely on Mr. Ciralsky’s Jewish background. Mr. Ciralsky subsequently sued the CIA and FBI for discrimination, which led to a CIA investigation of Mr. Szady and the CEG in 1998. The Anti-Defamation League was hired to perform “sensitivity training” of CEG employees at that time.

According to reports, Mr. Szady has a history of blocking or delaying security clearances for Jewish employees and singling them out for minor security matters. Despite his disturbing record, in 2001 President Bush appointed Mr. Szady to head the interagency unit known as the National Counterintelligence Policy Board where he served for two years before returning to the FBI in 2002.

Wexler’s letter also questions the Bush Administration’s handling of the AIPAC investigation, including its leaking information to the press, appointing Mr. Szady to lead this investigation and failure to share information with Congress. Wexler sent a letter to Attorney General John Ashcroft on September 3 asking that he provide details to Congress about the investigation. Mr. Ashcroft has yet to respond to his request.

(Please find a copy of the letter below)

President George W. Bush

The White House

1600 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW

Washington, DC 20500

September 29, 2004

Dear Mr. President:

I am writing in regard to the FBI’s ongoing investigation of the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) and allegations that it may have served as a conduit for the transmittal of classified information to Israel. According to recent press reports, this investigation has been headed by the FBI’s Assistant Director for Counterintelligence, David Szady, who has a history of targeting Jewish employees and initiating discriminatory intelligence probes. It is in this vein that I urge you to investigate Mr. Szady’s purported anti-Semitic record at the CIA and FBI and examine whether or not he should be leading this case. If these allegations are found to be true, I urge you to remove Mr. Szady from the AIPAC investigation, dismiss him from his post at the FBI and determine if anti-Semitic sentiment and unwarranted skepticism of Jews may have been the impetus for the AIPAC probe.

Given the fact that no information has surfaced to substantiate the highly incriminating accusations against AIPAC, I am perplexed by the manner in which you and your Administration have handled this case. As such, I urge you to take immediate action to ameliorate the unconscionable circumstances surrounding the investigation of AIPAC including – but not limited to – ending egregious press leaks from the Administration and providing Congress with further information about this case.

In a letter to Attorney General John Ashcroft on September 3 rd, I requested that he provide Congress with details of the AIPAC investigation and expressed my deep misgivings about leaks stemming from the Department of Justice (DOJ) at a time when suspects have not been officially named by the FBI and charges have yet to be filed. I also question the very premise of this investigation, considering no evidence has surfaced suggesting that AIPAC staff committed espionage, violated the law or even crossed the line requiring registration as a foreign agent with the Department of Justice. If crimes have been committed, then those responsible must be held accountable. If no illegalities have occurred, however, I strongly urge you to do everything in your power to exonerate AIPAC and its staff from this public castigation.

Mr. President, it appears as though your Administration has responded to this investigation with both negligence and deception. Having known about this case for over two years, one would think that you would have either temporarily severed ties with AIPAC’s leadership, or put an end to what appears to be a baseless witch-hunt against them. Instead, you have allowed dubious press reports to circulate which have been damaging to the American Jewish community and U.S.-Israel relations. One of the most disconcerting effects of these reports – which have been rampant in the European and Arab press – are that they have effectively provided fodder to anti-Semitic conspiracy theorists throughout the world who believe that U.S. policy in the Middle East is driven by the American Jewish community and Israel.

While an increase in anti-Semitism may be the result of this investigation, it appears it may also have been the driving force. In the weeks since this story became public, there has been growing suspicion that the impetus for this case may have been anti-Semitic sentiment in the FBI and suspicions that American Jews hold so-called “dual loyalties” to Israel. This theory has been exacerbated by reports that the investigation is led by David Szady, an FBI agent known for targeting Jews in the intelligence field. Given his history, one cannot help but question the propriety of appointing Mr. Szady to lead this case, especially considering the highly-sensitive nature of the AIPAC probe.

As you may be aware, in 1997 Mr. Szady directed an overtly anti-Jewish investigation of a former CIA legal staffer, Adam Ciralsky, in his capacity as head of the Counter Espionage Group (CEG) in the CIA. At the onset of this investigation, the CIA created a “Jewish Resume” for Mr. Ciralsky questioning his teenage trips to Israel, association with the Milwaukee Jewish Federation, education in Judaic studies at George Washington University and other innocuous aspects of his life as a Jew. During this probe, CIA officials also questioned whether his nephew – who was a mere five months old at the time – worked for the Israeli government and were determined to fire Mr. Ciralsky for suspicions of inappropriate ties to Israel. This case received much publicity when Mr. Ciralsky subsequently filed a lawsuit against the CIA and FBI for religious discrimination, and the CIA hired the Anti-Defamation League to conduct "sensitivity training" within the ranks of Szady's CEG.

In 1999, former CIA Director George Tenet stated that “insensitive, unprofessional and highly inappropriate language” was used by the CEG in the Ciralsky investigation. Unfortunately, this was not the only time that Mr. Szady has been accused of anti-Jewish bias in the workplace. According to reports, Jewish community leaders have complained that Szady has unfairly focused on Jewish employees, rejecting or slowing their security clearances and singling them out for minor security matters. As such, Mr. Szady and the CEG were the focus of an external and internal CIA investigation to determine if anti-Semitism played a role in the Ciralsky case. Despite his disturbing record, in 2001 you appointed Mr. Szady to head the interagency unit known as the National Counterintelligence Policy Board where he served for two years before returning to the FBI in 2002.

Mr. President, in light of these serious allegations, I respectfully request that you determine whether or not Mr. Szady has a record of unfairly targeting Jews. If so, I urge you to remove him from this case and dismiss Mr. Szady from the ranks of the American intelligence community. I also strongly urge you to re-examine the AIPAC probe and consider the possibility that it may have been instigated by similar circumstances that led to the Ciralsky case. It is critical that your Administration implement and enforce a zero-tolerance policy when it comes to discrimination of any kind in the CIA, FBI and other federal agencies.

In my experience with AIPAC, I have found it to be one of the most principled and effective organizations in Washington which has always conducted its business with professionalism, integrity and a deep commitment to American interests in the Middle East. Given AIPAC’s esteemed record and reputation, it is difficult to envision a case of espionage stemming from the highest ranks of this organization. It is in this regard that I strongly urge you to further investigate this matter and determine the basis and circumstances surrounding this highly questionable case.

I thank you in advance for your time and consideration, and look forward to your response.


Robert Wexler" Joins in Smear of David Szady

Growing Suspicion AIPAC Probe Driven By Improper Agenda: "Growing Suspicion AIPAC Probe Driven By Improper Agenda
Senior FBI counter-intelligence official involved in case linked to
lawsuit against the FBI and CIA based on anti-Semitism and prejudice.
Maariv International - September 28, 2004

The FBI counter-intelligence probe against AIPAC, in which Pentagon analyst Larry Franklin allegedly passed on sensitive documents to AIPAC officials may be taking a new turn.

So far it has been characterized by a plethora of leaked hype, and a paucity of any evidence of wrongdoing. To date no arrests have been made, and the current status of the probe is unclear.

However new evidence has emerged that cast a new light on the entire affair, supporting those who from the outset voiced grave doubts about the veracity of the entire affair, claiming it was driven by an agenda.

The evidence revolves around the role of David Szady. He formerly held a senior position at the CIA's Counterintelligence Center, and currently holds a senior position in the FBI's Counterintelligence unit, which initiated the probe.

A Washington source intimately familiar with the US intelligence community has confirmed to Maariv that David Szady personally initiated and oversaw the AIPAC probe.

Szady has been linked to a lawsuit filed by former CIA employee Adam Ciralsky. In the suit, currently being heard by the US District court in the District of Columbia, he claims to be the victim of anti-Jewish discrimination, which ended with his unlawful dismissal from the agency. David Szady is not among the list of defendants, which includes former CIA director George Tenet, and FBI director Louis Freeh, and several other senior Agency and bureau officials, including one "John Doe" Chief Counterintelligence Center CIA.

According to the suit, filed by Attorneys David H. Shapiro, Edward Tolchin and Janine Brookner, he was the victim of "outrageous, constitutionally repugnant, and ultra vires counterintelligence ("CI") and security investigations and disciplinary processes conducted against the plaintiff Adam J. Ciralsky by officials of the Central Intelligence Agency ("CIA" or the "Agency") and the Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI" or the "Bureau")".

"Mr. Ciralsky was unjustly singled out for investigation and subsequently interrogated, harassed, subjected to surveillance and terminated from employment with the CIA solely because he is a Jew and he practices the Jewish religion. Moreover, this ultra vires and constitutionally repugnant conduct was knowingly undertaken by defendants in conformance with a custom, policy and practice of both the CIA and FBI".

"Here, Mr. Ciralsky seeks damages to compensate for him for his injuries, and injunctive relief to prevent further harm to himself and other Jewish-Americans who work or seek to work in the federal government in so-called intelligence agencies. Indeed, damages and injunctive and other equitable relief are being sought pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act".

Mr Szady had previously been named by senior officials of major Jewish organizations as being one of the driving forces behind the counter-intelligence probe that resulted in the firing of Mr. Ciralsky.

Former CIA Director George Tenet has admitted, in a letter he wrote to the ADL, that the CIA counter-intelligence unit headed by Szady operated in an "insensitive, unprofessional and inappropriate manner" regarding the Adam Ciralsky case.

Subsequently Szady transferred to the FBI, where he currently holds a senior position in the Bureau's CI (Counter-Intelligence) department, which is responsible for the probe involving AIPAC, and is believed to be behind the damaging leaks.

Jewish leaders say this is not the first time David Szady has hit their radar screens. "This guy is bad news", said one of them, on condition of anonymity. "He has a record of targeting and harassing Jewish employees. This includes using inappropriate and unprofessional language that could be construed as bigoted, casting doubts and aspersions on their loyalty to the US, and laying whatever bureaucratic mines he could in their paths".

The FBI has denied any allegations of anti-Semitism on the part of Szady. "David Szady holds no anti-Semitic views, and has never handled a case based on any individual's ethnicity", said a FBI spokesperson questioned previously on this affair.

Other Jewish officials and officers of Jewish organizations are willing to bear this out. "I do not believe he is anti-Semitic", said one senior Jewish official. "I have spoken to Jews who know him personally, and have been to his house, and they have assured me he is not anti-Semitic. They have said however that he may be somewhat overzealous, especially in the hunt for Agent X, who some FBI officials still believe worked with convicted spy Jonathan Pollard, despite the fact that no evidence supporting allegations of his existence has ever come to light over the past 18 years since Pollard was apprehended".

A senior official of a major Jewish organization has said that although there is no conclusive evidence that points to Mr. Szady being a bigot and anti-Semite, the Ciralsky case "showed that there existed, within the CIA at the time, an atmosphere tolerant of insensitive and inappropriate attitudes and demeanor, including in the unit headed by Mr Szady".

He also said that it is important to remain vigilant, since "no institution is ever totally immune to the bacilli of anti-Semitism". "Significant progress has been made. If one looks at the State Department, traditionally considered a bastion of genteel and not always so genteel anti-Semitism, and reflects on the number of Jews who have held senior positions in that body over the past two decades, it is clear that things have significantly changed for the better".

Following the exposure of the Ciralsky case the ADL was approached by former CIA director George Tenet to conduct "sensitivity training", which goes on to this day. FBI director Louis Freeh has adopted a similar program, also run by the ADL.

David Shapiro, Adam Ciralsky's attorney said that his client's current employment conditions "prohibit him from making any further comment on the case, over and above the brief filed with court, which is a matter of public record"."

Federal Bureau of Investigation - FBI Executives - David W. Szady

Federal Bureau of Investigation - FBI Executives: "David W. Szady - Assistant Director, Counterintelligence Division

Mr. Szady currently serves as the Assistant Director of the Counterintelligence Division, appointed to that position March 2002 and reappointed following his mandatory retirement on November 4, 2003. Mr. Szady's former position was as the National Counterintelligence Executive (NCIX), a position created by a Presidential Decision Directive in December 2000.

Mr. Szady has over 30 years of service in the FBI, with 25 years experience in espionage and foreign counterintelligence investigations. He entered on duty with the FBI in September 1972 and was assigned to the FBI's Mobile, Alabama, Field Division where he worked general criminal investigative matters. From 1975 until 1980 he served in the FBI's Washington Field Office and worked in the FBI's Foreign Counterintelligence (FCI) program and established himself as an FCI Soviet expert. In 1980, Mr. Szady was assigned as a supervisor in the FBI Headquarters Intelligence Division during which time he was commended for his supervision and personal attention to the John Walker espionage investigation. In 1985, he was assigned to the FBI's San Francisco Division where he served in a supervisory capacity for both criminal investigative and FCI matters. He was recognized for his grasp of counterintelligence issues associated with the hostile intelligence threat in Silicon Valley.

In 1995, Mr. Szady was appointed to the position of Assistant Special Agent in Charge of the San Francisco Division with responsibility for San Francisco's FCI and Terrorism Programs. In 1997 he was appointed to the position of Chief of the CIA's Counter-intelligence Center's Counterespionage Group (CEG), a position mandated by Presidential Decision Directive to be held by a senior executive of the FBI. For his service in this capacity, Mr. Szady was awarded the CIA's Directorate of Operations (DO) Donovan Award and the CIA's Agency Seal Medallion. In May 1999, Mr. Szady was appointed Special Agent in Charge of the FBI's Portland Division where he was responsible for all FBI operations in Oregon.
Mr. Szady was born and raised in Massachusetts. He received a B.A. degree in biology from St. Michaels College in Vermont in 1966, a M.Ed degree in administration from Fitchburg State College in Massachusetts in 1969, and an M.S.T. degree in chemistry from the University of New Hampshire in 1972."

Internet HaganahSmears David Szady

Internet Haganah::Haganah b' Internet: "David Szady, the senior FBI counterintelligence official currently heading the controversial investigation of the American Israel Public Affairs Committee, is well-known to senior Jewish communal officials, who assert he has targeted Jews in the past.

Now, an investigation reveals that Szady was involved in a well-publicized case involving a Jewish former CIA staff attorney who sued the FBI, the CIA and its top officials for religious discrimination.

Although not named in the suit, Szady headed the elite department that former CIA Director George Tenet admitted in 1999 was involved with "insensitive, unprofessional and highly inappropriate" language regarding the case of the attorney, Adam Ciralsky.

The AIPAC investigation, which CBS broke last month on the eve of the Republican convention, is believed to focus on a Pentagon official suspected of passing a classified draft policy statement on Iran to AIPAC, the pro-Israel lobby, which allegedly then passed it on to Israel.

AIPAC denies any wrongdoing and has called the alleged charges "baseless." But the case cast a spotlight on the venerable lobbying organization and has sent shock waves through the Jewish community.

Jewish communal officials and members of Congress have protested the investigation and the media frenzy around it, calling for an investigation into who leaked the investigation and for what purpose.

Many questions remain unresolved, including who initiated the investigation, believed to have begun two years ago, and why.

Szady, who was appointed by President Bush in 2001 to head a little-known intelligence interagency unit known as the National Counter Intelligence Policy Board, returned to the FBI about two years ago, becoming assistant director for counterintelligence.

Jewish communal officials familiar with Szady assert he has targeted Jews, blocked or slowed their clearances and squeezed minor security violators.

"He's bad, very bad," declared one senior Jewish organizational executive, who like all those familiar with Szady declined to speak for the record.

According to exclusively obtained documents, Szady was directly involved in the Ciralsky case. He is identified in the documents as the chief of the CIA's Counterespionage Group, known as CEG, which was later accused of targeting Ciralsky for being Jewish and a supporter of Israel.

Szady would not respond directly to a request for an interview, but FBI spokeswoman Cassandra Chandler said, "David Szady has informed me that he has no anti-Semitic views, has never handled a case or investigation based upon an individual's ethnicity or religious views, and would never do so."
Of the AIPAC investigation in particular, Chandler said: "Investigations are predicated upon information of possible illegal or intelligence activity. The suggestion that the FBI or any FBI official has influenced this investigation based on moral, ethnic or religious bias is simply unfounded, untrue, and contrary to the very values the FBI holds highest."

Ciralsky's problems began as soon as he joined the CIA's legal staff as a junior member in early December 1996. Within days, CIA security personnel began creating a special file on Ciralsky and his Jewish background, according to the documents.

One Dec. 19, 1996, internal CIA memo on Ciralsky indicated that a CIA supervisor "would like to keep current on developments for damage control purposes."

By Jan. 15, 1997, the agency had created a four-page annotated "Jewish resume" of Ciralsky, which was classified "secret." The resume listed Ciralsky's teenage trips to Israel in 1987 with the Milwaukee federation and for Passover in 1988, his camp counselor stint at the Milwaukee JCC's day camp, and his minor in Judaic studies at George Washington University. His major in international affairs was not mentioned.

Shortly thereafter, CIA security personnel were asking whether Ciralsky's nephew might be working with the Israeli government, according to documents; the nephew was only about five months old at the time.

By May 1997, Szady, a 32-year veteran of the FBI, had joined the CIA as chief of the Counterespionage Group, within the CIA's Counterintelligence Center. A presidential directive mandates that an independent FBI official serve as chief of the CIA's Counterespionage Group.

Although Szady was not in his post when Ciralsky was hired, shortly after Szady assumed his new position, the counterespionage group appeared determined to terminate Ciralsky.

On June 12, 1997, a memo entitled, "Spot Report-Next Steps in the Adam Ciralsky Case" was circulated by Szady's department, outlining what would be done to force Ciralsky from the agency.

The report and the routing slips were tagged with classifications such as "sensitive," "restricted handling" and "eyes only, no registries" thus ensuring that the documents would not end up in any formal and traceable file.

Although Szady's name is blocked out, his bureaucratic initials, C/CEG/CIC, on two routing pages plus the hand-written acknowledgment next to his initials, show he received the "Spot Report" the day it was written, according to sources with personal knowledge of the case.

By September 1997, unable to find any incriminating information on Ciralsky, Szady's CEG assigned teams of investigators to ramp up the pressure with multiple interrogations, according to documents.

One CEG investigator's memo on Sept. 12, 1997, suggests questions for interrogators to ask Ciralsky, such as, "What is your family's relation with Israeli President Ezer Wizman (sic)?"

This question was based on the fact that Ciralsky is a distant relative of Ezer Weizman, who was Israel's president at the time.

The Sept. 12, 1997 memo added, "Maybe his family has donated money to Israeli government causes."

The memo also quotes one of Szady's investigators, saying "From my experience with rich Jewish friends from college, I would fully expect Adam's wealthy daddy to support Israeli political/social causes in some form… [such as] Israeli Bonds purchased through the United Jewish Appeal."

A week later, Sept. 19, 1997, before a security polygraph had even been administered, Szady's CEG circulated a secret memo, saying that former CIA director "Tenet says this guy is outta here because of lack of candor… Once that's over, it looks like we'll be waving goodbye to our friend."

Szady was third on the distribution list to receive that Sept. 19 memo, according to the routing slip and sources.

A handwritten note on the routing slips comments, "Great job — we should have Ciralsky's report in the security file… This will definitely…result in termination by cancellation of contract! Thx."

Ciralsky complained to the CIA's inspector general, the Office of Equal Employment Opportunity, to senior administration officials and to Malcolm Hoenlein, executive vice chairman of the Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations.

After the outlines of the Ciralsky story broke in 1998, the CIA launched an internal and external review of Szady's department, the CEG, to determine whether it had engaged in anti-Semitism.

As a result of that review, Tenet conceded in a letter to Abraham Foxman, the Anti-Defamation League's national director, that "some of the language used by some of the investigators in this case was insensitive, unprofessional and highly inappropriate."

After the review, the CIA hired the ADL to conduct "sensitivity training" within the ranks of Szady's CEG.

Foxman said, "The sensitivity training in the CIA was not directed at one individual. It was directed at a situation. There was a concern in the agency at that time, that the world was changing and the agency itself needed its staff to be sensitive to diversity."

After he left the CIA in 1998, when his contract was not renewed, Ciralsky filed a lawsuit against the CIA, the FBI and others, alleging that he was "unjustly singled out for investigation and subsequently interrogated, harassed, surveilled and terminated from employment with the CIA solely because he is a Jew and he practices the Jewish religion," according to the complaint.

Ciralsky's case was not isolated within the intelligence community, according to senior officials at Jewish organizations who declined to speak for the record. One Jewish official stated that he knew of as many as 10 other CIA employees who had been harassed or pressured because of their Jewish background, but they were afraid to come forward.

Postings on the CIA's internal Jewish-only bulletin board — the agency allows various ethnic groups within its ranks to share company tidbits — reflect that numerous employees feel anti-Semitism is rampant. One such posting in 2000, obtained from sources, asks, "Does anyone know how one would go about informing the D/CI [director of central intelligence] "directly that some incidents of anti-Semitism…are tolerated?"

Despite Szady's direct involvement in the Ciralsky case, Szady was decorated twice by the CIA for distinguished service, once with its Seal Medallion and once with the Donovan Award.

One Jewish communal official said of Szady, "He has never stopped looking for Mr. X," the elusive individual some FBI officials hypothesized worked with Jonathan Pollard, who was sentenced in 1987 for spying for Israel.

At least one senior Jewish official cautioned against concluding too much. "Szady might just be over-zealous. I know Jews who have been to his house and they assure they saw no evidence of prejudice."

On Szady's link to the Ciralsky case, American Jewish Congress chairman Jack Rosen said, "The FBI, in recent years, has been criticized for many things, and if the story is true, I would urge that an outside and independent individual or group come in to investigate."

Ciralsky, now a TV network newsman, declined to comment on his case. His lawsuit has been caught up in pre-trial legal limbo, hampered by a series of preliminary motions, according to attorneys familiar with the case.

(Award-winning investigative author and reporter Edwin Black has covered allegations of Israeli spying in the United States since the Pollard case. He is the author of the forthcoming book, "Banking on Baghdad" (Wiley), being released October 12, which chronicles 7,000 years of Iraqi history.)


Statement of Mr. David Szady on Changes the FBI is Making to the Counterintelligence Program

Statement of Mr. David Szady on Changes the FBI is Making to the Counterintelligence Program: "Statement for the Record of
David Szady
Assistant Director, Counterintelligence Division
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Changes the FBI is Making
to the Counterintelligence Program

Before the
United States Senate
Committee on the Judiciary
Washington, D.C.

Mr. Chairman, Senator Hatch, and other members of the Committee, I would like to express my appreciation to you for inviting me to share my thoughts and provide you with an update on the changes we are making to the Counterintelligence program at the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). I am pleased to be appearing jointly today with Kenneth Senser, Assistant Director of the FBI's recently established Security Division. By necessity the cooperation between our two Divisions is complementary and seamless. Our Director is committed to protecting the full range of U.S. national security interests and has made counterintelligence, along with counterterrorism and prevention, his highest priorities.

Because the world has changed so dramatically, the FBI is making significant changes to its Counterintelligence program. Our end goal is more effective and efficient detection, prevention, and disruption of hostile foreign intelligence activity directed against the United States and its interests. The FBI appreciates your support as we continue to implement these changes across our organization. First, I would like to provide a very brief assessment of the characteristics of the foreign intelligence threats of the 21st Century, for they provide a basis for understanding our new national, centrally managed counterintelligence strategy.

The Threat Environment

The United States today faces an intelligence threat that is far more complex than it has ever been historically. The threat is increasingly asymmetrical insofar as it seeks to exploit the areas where there is a perception of weakness within the U.S. national security approach and organizations. Traditional notions of counterintelligence that focus on hostile foreign intelligence services targeting classified national defense information simply do not reflect the realities of today's complex international structure. Foreign targeting of the elements of national power, including our vibrant national economic and commercial interests, continues to evolve. While traditional adversaries were limited to centrally controlled national intelligence services, today's adversaries include not only these traditional services but also non-traditional and non-state actors who operate from decentralized organizations. Moreover, the techniques and methodologies used to target classified, sensitive, and commercially valuable proprietary information march forward with the advance of technology.

This new environment and the uncertain future that accompanies it present the FBI with new challenges. The FBI's role as the leader of the nation's counterintelligence efforts requires that we understand all dimensions of the intelligence threats facing the nation and match them with new and innovative investigative and operational strategies. The FBI must continually assess and measure its performance against ever-evolving threats found in these new and different environments. The constant parade of new technologies, the vulnerabilities created by them, the extraordinary value of commercial information and the globalization of everything are but a few examples. The FBI must focus its resources on those actors that constitute the most significant intelligence threats facing the nation, wherever that might come from and in all of these new arenas.

The FBI Response

In response to the increasingly complex intelligence threat environment, the FBI is taking measures that re-orient its counterintelligence strategy, prioritize intelligence threats, and make the requisite organizational and managerial changes to ensure U.S. national security interests are protected. The following initiatives are underway:

Nationally-Directed Strategy

We recognize that in order to mitigate the intelligence threats our country is now facing, we must continually redesign our Counterintelligence program. Historically, when the threat lines were more clearly drawn, counterintelligence at the FBI was largely decentralized, with field divisions setting local priorities and assigning resources accordingly. To effectively recognize and counter the extremely diverse intelligence threats now evolving, a new more centralized and nationally directed, focused, and prioritized program is more effective. By centralizing our program we will ensure the ability of the FBI to be more proactive and predictive in protecting the critical national assets of our country. Centralization cements accountability regarding counterintelligence program direction, control and leadership. Moreover, a centralized counterintelligence program facilitates the FBI's cooperative and collaborative interaction with other members of the United States Intelligence Community. The counterintelligence environment must be transparent.

Our National Strategy will be totally integrated with the Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive (NCIX), or CI-21, to ensure that our efforts are focused on policy driven priorities and that we are positioned to protect identified critical national assets. Our efforts will also be seamless with the CIA to ensure that our counterintelligence efforts extend worldwide.

As part of this nationally directed strategy, I have undertaken a comprehensive strategic planning effort that is providing the FBI with the framework in which to prioritize and address intelligence threats. This framework is based on community-wide analysis and direction and recognizes that there can never be unlimited resources so we must be focused on the greatest threats. This will better position the FBI for the future by changing our performance expectations, management practices and processes and workforce. The central elements of this initiative are:

Development of clear strategic objectives and operational priorities in support of those objectives. As the Assistant Director of Counterintelligence for the FBI, I have responsibility for meeting these objectives and will be held accountable for their successful implementation. Some characteristics of this effort include the establishment of:
A highly trained and specialized Counterintelligence workforce with a management team that reinforces counterintelligence as a specialized priority career within the FBI.
A much stronger operational component within the Counterintelligence Division to include a stronger program management role and specific accountability at Headquarters.
An ongoing system of accountability that clearly defines responsibilities for all elements of counterintelligence both at Headquarters and in the field; and
An enhanced communication strategy that is more effectively communicating counterintelligence policy, plans, priorities, and management concerns throughout the counterintelligence program.
Greatly enhanced analytical support that relies more extensively on highly specialized disciplines and that is interwoven into the intelligence community as a whole.
Organizational Changes

Accepting responsibility to prevent and disrupt foreign intelligence threats and espionage from threatening U.S. national security requires the Counterintelligence Division to adopt a more proactive posture, the kind envisioned by CI-21. In order to fully evolve to this posture, the FBI is developing operational strategies that strategically align our resources in a manner consistent with community-wide national priorities. A fully proactive posture also requires candor in acknowledging our limitations and constraints, and courage in committing ourselves to confront and overcome them. One organizational change I have made consistent with this goal is the establishment of a Counterespionage Section within the Counterintelligence Division from existing base resources. This new section is responsible for managing all of our major espionage investigations. The section also evaluates and prioritizes all existing espionage cases to ensure effective allocation of financial and human resources and expertise to these top priority cases. I want to ensure that these cases are being handled and managed by the most highly skilled and trained FBI personnel.


In order to meet the challenges ahead of us, I am ensuring that the most important resources the Counterintelligence Division has, its human resources, have the appropriate tools available to effectively implement our mission. While the FBI has historically provided counterintelligence training to new special agents and support personnel and provided specialized courses as advances training, a systematic approach to a comprehensive counterintelligence training regimen applicable throughout an Agent's career has not been in place. The FBI is currently studying its counterintelligence training program. Agents and analysts assigned to work counterintelligence should have a systematic and integrated training program that allows them to continually refine their operational, investigative and analytical skills as their careers advance and a program to ensure that FBI counterintelligence personnel have the same knowledge and understandings as those elsewhere in the community.

Analysis is another area of my focus. Counterintelligence analysis is central to our program, as it not only provides tactical support to ongoing investigations and operations, but is also integral to providing strategic analysis in assessing the foreign intelligence threat we face. With the dissolution of the Investigative Service Division (ISD), many of the counterintelligence analysts have returned to the Counterintelligence Division. It is my job, working with our training Academy and our new college of analytical studies, to have in place a world class analytical function that operates seamlessly within the larger community effort. I think today's challenges require much greater reliance on, and bring in much greater numbers of, outside subject matter experts to bolster our efforts and understanding.

Information management and intelligence sharing are also two areas that we are improving in concert with the directives established by Director Mueller regarding these subjects. The technology being put in place at the FBI will vastly increase our capability to maximize the value of what we know and, even more basic, to know what we know. These new technologies will be the thread that ties the sum of the community body of knowledge together.


Counterintelligence and counterterrorism are the FBI's leading priorities. If we are to successfully mitigate the asymmetrical intelligence threats facing us today and in the future, a new approach, new ways of thinking and better technology are required. We are in the process of redesigning the counterintelligence program at the FBI. It will be much more centralized to ensure the program is nationally directed, prioritized, and that appropriate management and accountability measures are in place. The Counterintelligence Division will continue to work closely with the Security Division to ensure that our activities are complementary and that the FBI is able to comprehensively address any internal threats. Through our ongoing comprehensive strategic planning process, we are ensuring that our counterintelligence priorities, performance expectations and management practices are designed in a manner that is responsive to ensuring our national objectives are achieved. We are working to not only ensure that counterintelligence personnel have the best possible tools to conduct their work, but also to enhance the training and experience amongst counterintelligence personnel and to bolster counterintelligence as a specialized and vital career within the FBI."

Jewish Review smears David Szady

DAVID SZADY IN PORTLAN D: "Top agent in AIPAC probe sent to Portland after tainted 1999 inquiry of Jewish lawyer

Jewish Review
The senior FBI official who is at the center of a current federal investigation of the American Israel Public Affairs Committee became the special agent in charge of the FBI’s Portland Division immediately after a group he headed in 1999 was named in a public admission of government wrongdoing in the investigation of a Jew.

According to the FBI’s Web site, David Szady was posted as agent in charge of the FBI in Portland in May of 1999, one month after then CIA Director George Tenet admitted that a group headed by Szady had engaged in “inappropriate” conduct in its investigation of a Jewish attorney employed by the CIA.

A spokeswoman at the Portland FBI office said Szady served in Portland until May of 2001.

Today, Szady heads the FBI’s Counterintelligence Division and is the leading government figure in the U.S. government’s current probe of and alleged sting operation against AIPAC.

Investigative reporter Edwin Black, writing for the Jewish Telegraphic Agency, began a Sept. 20, 2004, story about Szady by asserting that Szady “is well-known to senior Jewish communal officials, who assert he has targeted Jews in the past.”

Black also reported, “Now, an investigation reveals that Szady was involved in a well-publicized case involving a Jewish former CIA staff attorney who sued the FBI, the CIA and its top officials for religious discrimination.

“Although not named in the suit, Szady headed the elite department that former CIA Director George Tenet admitted in 1999 was involved with ‘insensitive, unprofessional and highly inappropriate’” language regarding the case of the attorney, Adam Ciralsky.

It was April 13, 1999, that Tenet made that admission in a published letter to Anti-Defamation League Director Abraham H. Foxman. That admission came the month before Szady was sent to Portland.

Black’s report also noted: “According to exclusively obtained documents, Szady was directly involved in the Ciralsky case. He is identified in the documents as the chief of the CIA’s Counterespionage Group, known as CEG, which was later accused of targeting Ciralsky for being Jewish and a supporter of Israel.”

In the same story, Black quoted an FBI spokesperson on the issue of Szady’s interest in Jews: “David Szady has informed me that he has no anti-Semitic views, has never handled a case or investigation based upon an individual’s ethnicity or religious views, and would never do so.”

In more recent reporting of the AIPAC probe, Black has not commented further on allegations or suspicions of the possible targeting of Jews based on their ethnicity or religion."

Saturday, January 08, 2005

Undersecretary of State John Bolton is leaving State

Undersecretary of State John Bolton is leaving State "Reuters Jan 6, 2005

Hard-line State Dept. Official To Quit - Sources
Reuters Jan 6, 2005 — By Carol Giacomo, Diplomatic Correspondent

WASHINGTON (Reuters) - Undersecretary of State John Bolton, a leading hard-liner on nuclear nonproliferation who has raised hackles among America's allies as well as its adversaries, is expected to quit the Bush administration, sources said on Thursday.

His departure may signal a shift in U.S. diplomacy to a less confrontational approach as President Bush begins a second term in which he has pledged to reach out to allies estranged by the Iraq War and other policies.

Bolton, an outspoken and controversial policymaker, often provoked strong negative reactions from European allies and was identified more with the sticks than the carrots of U.S. diplomacy when dealing with countries like North Korea and Iran."